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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 2, 2010, 70.08% of Oklahoma voters elected to amend their state 
constitution by adopting State Question 755 (“SQ 755”), also known as the “Save 
Our State” amendment.  SQ 755 prohibits the Oklahoma judiciary from using Sharia 
Law or international law, and “looking to the precepts of other nations or cultures.”  
Although it was under the radar outside of Oklahoma before election day, SQ 
755 received a tremendous amount of attention after the measure passed.  Articles 
critical of the ban on Sharia Law appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street 
Journal, and the L.A. Times.1  SQ 755 was even lampooned on the Colbert Report as 
superfluous and absurd.2 
                                                          
 
1
 See, e.g., Jess Brevin, Oklahoma Is Sued Over Shariah Ban, WALL ST. J., Law Section, 
Nov. 5, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704805204575594793733847 
372.html; James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Judge Blocks a Ban on Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2010, at A22.; James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A12.; Michael A. Helfand, Op-Ed, A Law We Don’t Need: 
Oklahoma’s Amendment Prohibiting Courts from Considering Islam’s Sharia Law in 
Decisions Is the Product of Fear-Mongering, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/10/opinion/la-oe-helfand-oklahoma-20101110; Editorial, 
Overwrought in Oklahoma: The Passage in Oklahoma of a Ballot Measure that Bans Judges 
from Considering Islamic Law is an Offense to the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/11/opinion/la-ed-sharia-20101111; Ariane de Vogue, 
Shariah Law Outlawed in Oklahoma State Courts, Ignites Debate: Ban on Legal Deference to 
Religious Tradition Has National Implications, Critics Say, ABC News (Washington), Nov. 
11, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/shariah-law-ban-oklahoma-renews-debate-draws-
legal/story?id=12112985; Bill Mears, Judge Issues Permanent Injunction on Oklahoma 
Sharia Law Ban, CNN (Washington), Nov. 29, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-
29/us/oklahoma.sharia.law_1_sharia-law-state-courts-international-law?_s=PM:US. 
 
2
 Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 3, 2010).  Colbert stated: 
“Just because something doesn’t exist, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t ban it,” pointing out that 
Muslims make up less than four-tenths of one percent of Oklahoma’s population, and Sharia 
Law poses no real threat.  Id.  To further emphasize the absurdity of passing an anti-Sharia 
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It appears that the Oklahoma legislators preyed upon the electorate’s post-9/11 
fears and insecurities to introduce an amendment that was wholly unnecessary.  
Notably, a search of Oklahoma cases reveals that the state judiciary has never used 
the word “Sharia” in a published opinion.  A search for “Sharia” in Oklahoma 
federal courts yields one case, Bastian v. Gonzales, where the court explained that 
Indonesia’s potential imposition of Sharia law upon an asylum seeker did not justify 
granting him asylum in the U.S.3  The Bastian court did not interpret, analyze, or 
discuss any aspect of Sharia law.  It is therefore unclear exactly who or what SQ 755 
was meant to save.  Despite the fact that there was no cognizable threat, the 
Oklahoma legislature claims that SQ 755 was introduced as a “preemptive strike” 
against radical Islam.4 
SQ 755 was immediately and successfully challenged under the First 
Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  The case, Awad v. Ziriax,5 
has been widely covered in the media.  But, there is another aspect of SQ 755 that 
has not received attention outside of academic and human rights circles.6  In addition 
to banning Sharia Law, SQ 755 also prohibits Oklahoma courts from considering 
international law or foreign law. 
Other than in the “Background” section, this paper will not discuss Oklahoma’s 
banning of Sharia law.  The constitutional issues raised by that portion of SQ 755 
were largely addressed in Awad v. Ziriax.7  What is relevant to this discussion, 
however, is that the coupling of international law with Sharia Law in SQ 755 
appears to have been a deliberate attempt to sully international law, a body of law 
that has been part of U.S. jurisprudence since the founding of our nation. 
This paper will discuss SQ 755’s many legal deficiencies, focusing primarily on 
its constitutional infirmities.  First, SQ 755 is a clear violation of the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.  The prohibition on looking to 
international law requires that Oklahoma courts disregard U.S. treaty obligations, 
and the law of nations (also known as customary international law), which are all 
binding on American courts.  
Second, SQ 755 unconstitutionally limits a state’s duty to give full faith and 
credit to the judicial decisions of other states.  The law is clear that no state has the 
                                                          
Law in Oklahoma, Colbert suggested passing other laws that addressed non-existent threats 
like laws banning “cat-pilots, baby curling, and man-futon marriage.”  Id. 
 
3
 Bastian v. Gonzales, 187 Fed. App’x 891, 895 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 
4
 James C. McKinley, Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A22. 
 
5
 Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2010 WL 4814077 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2010). 
 
6
 See Colbert Report, supra note 2; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS & JOHANNA KALB, THE 
IMPACT OF OKLAHOMA STATE QUESTION 755: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INITIATIVES (Jan. 2011) (position paper published by the American Constitutional Society 
discussing some international law issues raised by SQ 755 and provisions like it but not 
discussing the constitutional implications); COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 
NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA REFERENDUM 
755—THE “SAVE OUR STATE AMENDMENT” (Dec. 2010) (ten page position paper discussing 
some of the constitutional implications of SQ 755). 
 
7
 Awad, 2010 WL 4814077. 
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authority to condition its compliance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause on policy 
considerations.   
Additionally, this paper will discuss ways in which SQ 755 raises separation of 
powers concerns, violates principles of international comity, and could have a 
destabilizing effect on legal and business communities. 
Finally, this paper will discuss how all of these provisions reflect both a deep 
misunderstanding and mistrust of the judiciary by the legislative branch.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Legislative History of SQ 755 
SQ 755 was initially titled House Joint Resolution 1056 (“HJR 1056”).  On May 
18, 2010, HJR 1056 passed in the Oklahoma House of Representatives by a vote of 
82 to 10.8  On May 24, 2010, HJR 1056 passed in the Oklahoma Senate by a vote of 
42 to 2.9  The Office of the Secretary of State re-numbered HJR 1056 and gave it the 
title “State Question 755.” 
SQ 755 reads: 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising 
their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in 
the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United 
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established 
common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant 
thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States 
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in 
making judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to the legal precepts 
of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the courts shall not consider 
international law or Sharia Law.  The provisions of this subsection shall 
apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited 
to, cases of first impression.10 
SQ 755 also included a proposed ballot title, which read:   
This measure amends the State Constitution.  It would change a section 
that deals with the courts of this state.  It would make courts rely on 
federal and state laws when deciding cases.  It would forbid courts from 
looking at international law or Sharia Law when deciding cases.11  
A ballot title provides a summary of the proposed amendment and explains 
vague or unfamiliar terms for voters. 
                                                          
 
8
 OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE VOTES FOR 2010–52ND LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.okhouse.gov/Legislation/Show Votes.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 
9
 OKLAHOMA SENATE, OKLAHOMA STATE SENATE 2010 VOTES, 
http://www.oksenate.gov/legislation/votes/votes_2010/2010_votes.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 
10
 Id.  
 
11
 Id. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss2/3
2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA’S SQ 755 193 
 
On May 25, 2010, Secretary of State M. Susan Savage forwarded SQ 755 to 
Attorney General Drew Edmonson for review, as required by 34 Okla. Stat. § 9(C).12  
On June 2, 2010, Attorney General Edmonson responded that the legislature’s 
proposed ballot title did not comply with Oklahoma law, stating that “[i]t does not 
adequately explain the effect of the proposition because it does not explain what 
either Sharia Law or international law is.”13 
On June 4, 2010, Attorney General Edmonson sent a letter to Secretary of State 
Savage, House Speaker Chris Benge, and Senate President Pro Tempore Glen 
Coffee, proposing an alternate ballot title.14  The alternate ballot title read: 
This measure amends the State Constitution.  It changes a section that 
deals with the courts of this state.  It would amend Article 7, Section 1.  It 
makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases.  It forbids 
courts from considering or using international law.  It forbids courts from 
considering or using Sharia Law.  
 
International law is also known as the law of nations.  It deals with the 
conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as 
countries, states and tribes.  It deals with their relationship with each 
other.  It also deals with some of their relationships with persons.  
 
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations.  
Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well 
as treaties.  
 
Sharia Law is Islamic law.  It is based on two principal sources, the Koran 
and the teaching of Mohammed.15 
This ballot title redraft is legally critical.  According to Oklahoma law, when a 
court is evaluating the legality of a constitutional amendment, the court considers not 
only the amendment’s text, but also the language of the ballot title.16  Therefore, any 
deficiencies in the ballot title are considered deficiencies of the whole amendment.  
As will be discussed below, SQ 755’s inclusion of treaties in its definition of 
                                                          
 
12
 Letter from M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y of State, to W. A. Drew Edmonson, Okla. 
Att’y Gen. (May 25, 2010). 
 
13
 Letter from W. A. Drew Edmonson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y 
of State, Glenn Coffee, Okla. Senate President Pro Tempore, and Chris Benge, Okla. Speaker 
of the House of Representatives (June 2, 2010). 
 
14
 Letter from W. A. Drew Edmonson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y 
of State, Glenn Coffee, Okla. Senate President Pro Tempore, and Chris Benge, Okla. Speaker 
of the House of Representatives (June 4, 2010). 
 
15
 Id. 
 
16
  Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009) 
(“When construing a constitutional amendment that was proposed by the Legislature . . . th[e] 
Court will read the ballot title together with the text of the measure, even if the text of the 
measure contains no ambiguities or absurdities.”). 
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international law renders the whole amendment unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause, which makes treaties “the supreme Law of the Land.”17   
On August 9, 2010, Governor Brad Henry issued an Executive Proclamation 
ordering that SQ 755, along with its ballot title, be placed on the statewide ballot.18  
Accordingly, when 70.08% of Oklahoma voters elected to adopt the “Save Our State 
Amendment,”19 they approved both the ballot title and the actual amendment’s 
language.   
B.  Statutory and Constitutional Measures Similar to SQ 755 
SQ 755 is not unique.  Several copy-cat bills and constitutional amendments have 
been proposed or enacted by legislatures across the U.S.20  These provisions fall into 
two basic categories: (1) measures that are identical or substantially similar to SQ 
755, and (2) choice of law provisions that forbid the application of international law 
and foreign law when there is a conflict with state or federal law.  
Some of these measures track SQ 755 very closely.  For example, Wyoming’s HJ 
821 and Missouri’s HJR 31,22 which proposed constitutional amendments introduced 
                                                          
 
17
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 
18
 Brad Henry, Governor of Okla., Executive Proclamation (Aug. 9, 2010). 
 
19
 OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, SUMMARY RESULTS: GENERAL ELECTION—
NOVEMBER 2, 2010, http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 
20
 See DAVIS & KALB, supra note 6. 
 
21
 H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2011), available at http://legisweb.state.wy. 
us/2011/Introduced/HJ0008.pdf.  HJ 8 reads:  
When exercising their judicial authority the courts of this state shall uphold and 
adhere to the law as provided in the constitution of the United States, the Wyoming 
constitution, the United States Code and federal regulations promulgated pursuant 
thereto, laws of this state, established common law as specified by legislative 
enactment, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the 
law of the other state does not include Sharia law.  The courts shall not consider the 
legal precepts of other nations or cultures including, without limitation, international 
law and Sharia law.  The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before 
the respective courts including, without limitation, cases of first impression. 
Id. 
 
22
 H.R.J. Res. 31, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011), available at http://www.house.mo. 
gov/billsummary.aspx?year=2011&bill=HJR%2031.  HJR 31 reads:  
The courts provided for in this section, when exercising their judicial authority, shall 
uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the 
Constitution of Missouri, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States, 
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia law, in making judicial 
decisions.  The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law.  The 
provisions of this section shall apply to all cases before the respective courts, 
including but not limited to cases of first impression. 
Id. 
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in early 2011, are nearly identical to SQ 755.  Other provisions are slight variations 
on the theme.  For example South Dakota’s HJR 1004 is a proposed constitutional 
amendment that bans the consideration of international law, foreign law, and 
religious/cultural law; it does not specifically mention Sharia.23  Texas’s HJR 57 
does not mention foreign law or international law, but bans the consideration of 
“religious law” and “cultural law.”24 
While all of these provisions are openly hostile to foreign law and international 
law, some measures go beyond banning the consideration of non-U.S. law.  
Arizona’s SCR 1010, introduced in Arizona’s House of Representatives in January 
2011, would forbid the state judiciary from looking to non-U.S. law and from 
upholding sister state decisions that are based on international law.25   
Similarly, South Carolina’s S. 1387 was a proposed constitutional amendment 
that would have banned South Carolina courts from looking “to the legal precepts of 
other nations or cultures.”26  “[T]he courts [would not be allowed to] consider Sharia 
Law, international law, the constitutions, laws, rules, regulations, and decisions of 
courts or tribunals of other nations, or conventions or treaties, whether or not the 
United States is a party.”27  S. 1387 specifically rejected all treaties in the body of 
the amendment, even those that the United States has ratified.28 
                                                          
 
23
 H.R.J. Res. 1004, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/ 
sessions/2011/Bills/HJR1004P.htm.  HJR 1004 reads: 
The judicial power of the state is vested in a unified judicial system consisting of a 
Supreme Court, circuit courts of general jurisdiction and courts of limited original 
jurisdiction as established by the Legislature.  No such court may apply international 
law, the law of any foreign nation, or any foreign religious or moral code with the 
force of law in the adjudication of any case under its jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 
24
 H.R.J. Res. 57, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011), available at http://www.capitol.state. 
tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=82R&Bill=HJR57.  HJR 1057 reads, “A court of this 
state shall uphold the laws of the Constitution of the United States, this Constitution, federal 
laws, and laws of this state.  A court of this state may not enforce, consider, or apply any 
religious or cultural law.”  Id. 
 
25
 S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/scr1010p.pdf.  SCR 1010 reads:  
In making judicial decisions, the courts provided for in subsection A, when exercising 
their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United 
States Constitution, the Constitution of this state, the United States code, federal 
regulations adopted pursuant to the United States code, established common law, the 
laws of this state and rules adopted pursuant to the laws of this state and, if necessary, 
the laws of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does 
not include international law.  The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures.  The courts shall not consider international law. 
Id. 
 
26
 H.R.J. Res. 8, 118th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009-10), available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/1387.htm. 
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 Id.  South Carolina’s election rules direct voters to the full text of constitutional 
amendments, which are posted at the polling place, and a Constitutional Ballot Commission 
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Additionally, many state legislatures have either proposed or passed statutes that 
explicitly instruct state courts to ignore foreign law or international law when it 
conflicts with state or federal law.  In May 2010, Louisiana’s legislature passed 
“American and Louisiana Laws for Louisiana Courts.”29  The bill renders void any 
choice of law provision preferring foreign law that would violate a right guaranteed 
under either the U.S. Constitution or the Louisiana Constitution.30  “Tennessee Law 
for Tennessee Courts” passed in the same month, re-enforces that when applying 
principles of international comity, the rights guaranteed by the Tennessee and U.S. 
constitutions are of primary concern.31  Similar provisions are currently pending in 
Arkansas,32 Georgia,33 Indiana,34 Missouri,35 New Jersey,36 Nebraska,37 South 
Carolina,38 and South Dakota.39  
These choice of law bills are redundant and serve no legitimate purpose.  They 
do not establish any new law, as it is well settled that the rights guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution and the various state constitutions are the primary concern of U.S. 
courts.   
Some state legislatures have attempted to go even further to restrict the 
judiciary’s consideration of international and foreign law.  In addition to the 
constitutional amendment discussed above, Arizona’s House of Representatives 
proposed HB 2582 in January 2011.  The statute would eliminate the judiciary’s 
ability to use foreign law or international law as either controlling or influential 
                                                          
may deem a simplified or more detailed explanation of the proposed change to also appear on 
the ballot.  S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-2110 (2010). 
 
29
 2010 La. Acts 274, available at www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did= 
722536. 
 
30
 Id. 
 
31
 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts 550, available at http://state.tn.us/sos/acts/106/pub/pc0983.pdf. 
 
32
 S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011), available at www.arkleg.state. 
ar.us/assembly/2011/2011R/Bills/SB97.pdf. 
 
33
 H.B. 242, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011), available at http://www.legis.ga. 
gov/Legislation/en-US/display.aspx?Legislation=32674. 
 
34
 S.J. Res. 16, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011), available at http://www.in. 
gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2011&session=1&request=getBill&docno=0016
&doctype=SJR. 
 
35
 S.B. 308, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011), available at http://www.senate. 
mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=4170067. 
 
36
 A.B. 3496, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state. 
nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3467_I1.HTM. 
 
37
 L.B. 647, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/ 
bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=12719. 
 
38
 S. 444, 2011 Leg., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/ 
sess119_2011-2012/bills/444.htm. 
 
39
 S.B. 201, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011), available at 
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2011/Bill.aspx?Bill=201. 
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precedent in decisions.40  HB 2582 would render void any decision relying in whole 
or in part on non-U.S. law.41  In addition, a judge’s use of foreign law or 
international law would be grounds for impeachment and removal from office.42 
In 2010, the Idaho state legislature passed a similar, although not quite as drastic, 
resolution that states: “For any domestic issue, no court should consider or use as 
precedent any foreign or international law, regulation, or court decision.”43  Iowa’s 
House File 2313, a bill introduced on February 5, 2010, limits judicial authority to 
use only the United States Constitution, the Iowa State Constitution, and the Iowa 
Code “as the basis for any ruling.”44  It states: “a judicial officer shall not use judicial 
precedent, case law, penumbras, or international law as a basis for rulings.”45  It is 
currently pending in Iowa’s judiciary committee. 
The obvious subtext of all of these provisions is a mistrust of international or 
foreign law.  But, the less obvious subtext is a mistrust of the judiciary.  SQ 755 and 
other provisions like it are clear attempts to limit the power of the courts.  Although 
unsubstantiated, it has been a clarion call of the far right that judges are somehow 
out of control and must be reined-in.  Judges have been receiving threats in 
unprecedented numbers for simply doing their jobs.46  
The titles of these provisions are telling.  SQ 755 is called the “Save our State” 
amendment.  Louisiana’s statute is called the “American and Louisiana Laws for 
Louisiana Courts.”  And Tennessee’s statute is called “TN Law for TN Courts.”  The 
titles imply that the judiciary is applying law that is somehow counter to a state’s 
laws and interests.  Because all of the measures ban the use of international and 
foreign law, the implication is that those bodies of law pose a threat to the very 
foundation of the administration of justice.  This group of laws makes clear that 
                                                          
 
40
 H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/hb2582p.htm. 
 
41
 Id. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 H.R. Con. Res. 44, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010), available at http://www. 
legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/Journals/hday38.pdf. 
 
44
 H.F. 2313, 83d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2010), available at http://coolice.legis. 
state.ia.us/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=BillInfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&ga=83 
&hbill=HF2313. 
 
45
 Id. 
 
46
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legislators do not trust judges to carry out one of their core functions—determining 
which law to apply in their adjudication of cases. 
As is demonstrated in this paper, the very existence of these provisions reflects a 
total lack of understanding of how courts function.  Indeed, Associate Justice 
Stephen Breyer specifically stated that there are instances where judges “must” apply 
international or foreign law.47  In the Supreme Court term that began in October 
2010, out of eighty cases considered by the Court, six cases involved issues of 
international or foreign law.  Justice Breyer stated that because of the increased 
global inter-connectedness of commerce and communications it “is the future” for 
judges to use foreign and international law.48 
C.  Successful Establishment Clause Challenge to SQ 755 
Immediately after SQ 755 passed, Muneer Awad, of Oklahoma’s CAIR (Council 
on Islamic-American Relations) chapter, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 
to prevent the certification of SQ 755’s election results, based exclusively on the 
First Amendment.  
On November 9, 2010, Judge Vicki Miles-La Grange of the U.S. District Court 
of the Western District of Oklahoma issued a temporary restraining order against the 
certification of SQ 755.  She subsequently converted the temporary restraining order 
into a preliminary injunction.49  As a result, SQ 755 cannot go into effect.   
The court found that Mr. Awad had standing to bring his action because 
he is a Muslim residing in Oklahoma, and the “amendment conveys an 
official government message of disapproval and hostility towards his 
religious beliefs . . . chilling his access to the government and forcing him 
to curtail his political and religious activities.”50 
Judge Miles-La Grange then evaluated Mr. Awad’s motion using a standard four 
part test. 
A movant seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the 
injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to 
the party opposing the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be 
adverse to the public interest.51 
Judge Miles-La Grange found that Mr. Awad’s challenge met all four prongs and 
granted him a preliminary injunction.52  Notably, when evaluating Mr. Awad’s 
claims under the first prong, the court found that there was a substantial likelihood of 
success on the challenge under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  
Judge Miles-La Grange held that SQ 755’s language “singles out” Mr. Awad’s 
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religion (Islam) and can be reasonably understood as a state sanctioned “disapproval 
of [the] plaintiff’s faith.”53   
The opinion also noted that Sharia Law is not a codified set of laws, but rather a 
religious/cultural tradition.54  Therefore, using the umbrella term “Sharia Law” 
would foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion because it forces 
Oklahoma courts to determine which religious doctrines are included and which are 
not.55   
In addition, Judge Miles La-Grange found that SQ 755 is not facially neutral 
because it singles out Sharia Law.  Furthermore, she found that there was a 
reasonable probability that SQ 755 would not allow Mr. Awad’s will to be probated 
by an Oklahoma court because it includes “elements of the Islamic prophetic 
traditions.”56  Judge Miles-LaGrange also noted that there was a reasonable 
probability that SQ 755 would preclude Muslims from bringing actions in state court 
under the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act or the U.S. Constitution if their claims 
were based on the exercise of their religion.57  Therefore, Judge Miles-La Grange 
held that Mr. Awad’s challenge had significant likelihood of success on the merits. 
Moreover, when analyzing the third prong of the preliminary injunction test, the 
balance of harms, Judge Miles-La Grange ruled in favor of Mr. Awad.  She found, in 
part, that the defendants were not aware of any Oklahoma state courts that had used 
Sharia Law or the precepts of other nations in a decision.58 
Finally, when applying the fourth prong of the preliminary injunction test, Judge 
Miles-La Grange found that granting a preliminary injunction would not be adverse 
to the public interest.  In her opinion, Judge Miles-La Grange stated that “the public 
has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s 
constitutional rights,” than it does in seeing the will of the voters carried out.59  As 
additional support, Judge Miles-La Grange pointed to the Oklahoma Religious 
Freedoms Act, which prohibits governmental entities from impinging on the free 
exercise of religion.60  
On December 1, 2010, the Oklahoma Attorney General appealed the preliminary 
injunction.61  The order preventing the election results from being certified is still in 
effect, however.  The success in the Awad case and Judge Miles-La Grange’s lengthy 
and well-executed opinion provides a more than adequate legal framework for future 
successful challenges of other statutes or state constitutional provisions similar to SQ 
755 that prevent courts from considering Sharia Law.  
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This paper will focus on aspects of SQ 755 that have not been challenged in 
court.  It will discuss the legality of banning the consideration of international law in 
state courts.  This discussion is applicable not only to SQ 755 but also to the other 
similar statutory and constitutional provisions being considered throughout the 
country.  
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  SQ 755 Is Poorly Drafted and Internally Contradictory 
SQ 755’s language is internally inconsistent.  The measure is paradoxical 
because it directs Oklahoma courts to uphold the U.S. Constitution, but later forbids 
courts from applying international law, which, according to SQ 755’s ballot title, 
includes treaty law.62  Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, treaty 
law is “the supreme Law of the Land.”63  By SQ 755’s terms, an Oklahoma court 
confronted with an issue governed by treaty law must both disregard the treaty law, 
while at the same time recognize the treaty as binding federal law.  
In addition, SQ 755’s prohibition on applying international law is in direct 
conflict with the amendment’s direction to uphold and adhere to federal law.  As will 
be discussed below in greater detail, international law has been considered a part of 
federal law for centuries.64  It is impossible to “uphold” and “adhere” to federal law, 
while simultaneously banning an area of law that has been a part of American law 
since this country was founded.65 
SQ 755’s direction to “uphold” and “adhere” to the law of another state as long 
as the other state does not include Sharia Law in its judicial decisions is also 
problematic.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not allow state courts to pick 
and choose which decisions they will “uphold” or “adhere” to.66  Oklahoma cannot 
disregard a sister state’s decision based on the content of that decision.  As drafted, 
SQ 755 simultaneously bans an Oklahoma court from enforcing a sister state 
decision that considered Sharia Law while compelling the court to adhere to the U.S. 
Constitution, which requires upholding that same decision under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. 
Unfortunately, a state constitutional amendment cannot be invalidated for being 
contradictory.  But jurists charged with interpreting SQ 755 can use these internal 
inconsistencies to continue to use international law when warranted.  They can place 
greater emphasis on the portion of SQ 755 that mandates that the court uphold the 
U.S. Constitution.  This would override the portion of SQ 755 that forbids 
considering international law.  Using this interpretive approach, courts could uphold 
their constitutional obligation to use international law in appropriate circumstances 
and justify their decision by using SQ 755’s own language.  If courts adopt this 
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method of construction, SQ 755 would only prohibit the application of international 
law that does not involve treaties or that is not a part of federal common law. 
B.  On its Face SQ 755 Violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is very clear that federal 
law, which includes treaty law, is the “supreme Law of the Land.”67  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.68 
1.  The Supremacy Clause Was Incorporated into the Constitution to Prevent States 
from Violating International Law 
The legislators who drafted SQ 755 and other provisions like it have shown a 
distinct lack of historical understanding about the U.S. Constitution and the reasons 
it was enacted.  In drafting the Constitution, the Founding Fathers wanted to ensure 
that international treaties were respected by the states.  They made sure the 
Constitution reflected this desire by including treaties as “the supreme Law of the 
Land” in the Supremacy Clause.69 
So, legislators who claim to be introducing these measures to uphold the sanctity 
of the U.S. Constitution, are actually subverting one of the main purposes of its 
drafters.  Anyone who has completed a basic U.S. history class knows that the 
Articles of Confederation were abandoned, in large part, because they gave the 
national government very little authority over the states.  The Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution was adopted to provide the federal government with a check 
against state laws that run counter to the national interest.  One of the Supremacy 
Clause’s specific targets was states’ failure to adhere to U.S. treaty obligations. 
As Justice Story stated in his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States, under the Articles of Confederation, “[t]he difficulty of enforcing 
even the obligations of the Treaty of [Paris] of 1783 was a most serious national 
evil.”70  The states’ refusal to adhere to treaty obligations after the Revolutionary 
War was so problematic that the British cited various state laws as an excuse for 
failing to execute their responsibilities under the treaty.  The British threatened not to 
withdraw from the American Confederacy unless the states honored the Treaty of 
Paris. 
Article IV of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 between Great Britain and the new 
American Confederacy specifically guaranteed that there would be no legal 
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impediment to collecting war-related debts.71  In a letter to Secretary of State John 
Adams, the British complained of state enactments that specifically prohibited the 
British from collecting debts in various states.72  After investigating the complaints, 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay “documented numerous violations of the 
Treaty of [Paris] by the United States.”73   
“Great Britain made loud complaints of infractions . . . on the part of the several 
states, and demanded redress.”74  Due to the states’ failure to observe their 
obligations, Britain would not surrender the western ports as required by the treaty.  
The entire nation “was consequently threatened with . . . calamities . . . on the . . . 
western borders, and was in danger of having its public peace subverted through its 
mere inability to enforce the treaty stipulations.”75   
For example, in Rutgers v. Waddington, Elizabeth Rutgers, the owner of a 
brewery that had been occupied by British soldiers during the war, sued for rent 
under the New York Trespass Act of 1783.76  Among the defenses that Alexander 
Hamilton, Waddington’s attorney, raised was that the Trespass Act was invalid 
because it was preempted by the Treaty of Paris.77  Under the Treaty of Paris both 
nations agreed that claims for “‘compensation, recompense, retribution or 
indemnity’” due to the war were “‘renounced and released.’”78  Hamilton argued that 
“‘when two or more laws clash that which relates to the most important concerns 
ought to prevail.’”79 
The court did not address Hamilton’s argument and the case was later settled.  
But, Rutgers v. Waddington is considered by some to be the first articulation of the 
supremacy of federal law in American jurisprudence.80 
In 1787, Congress attempted to address the states’ failure to comply with the 
Treaty of Paris.81  Congress passed resolutions that directed states to comply with the 
Treaty under the authority of the Articles of Confederation.  But the resolutions were 
“controversial and, in any event, the federal Government lacked a mechanism for 
making state courts enforce treaties.”82  Under the Articles of Confederation treaties 
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“[were] binding in moral obligation, but could not be constitutionally carried into 
effect.”83 
Early constitutional scholarship derided Congress’s ability to compel states to 
comply with federal treaty obligations prior to the adoption of the Constitution.84  
Discussing the problems that the early nation faced under the Articles of 
Confederation, Justice Story wrote that “[b]eing invested by the articles of 
confederation with a limited power to form commercial treaties, [Congress] 
endeavored to enter into treaties with foreign powers upon principles of 
reciprocity.”85  However, “[i]t was further pressed upon us, with a truth equally 
humiliating and undeniable, that congress possessed no effectual power to guaranty 
the faithful observance of any commercial regulations; and there must in such cases 
be reciprocal obligations.”86 
In April 1787, James Madison identified state violations of the “law of nations 
and of treaties” as one of the main problems that prompted the Constitutional 
Convention.87  The framers considered several plans for creating a more functional 
federal government.88  The framers rejected the Virginia Plan, which permitted the 
federal government to negate state laws that violated federal obligations.89  Instead, 
the framers adopted the New Jersey plan, which included a version of what we now 
know as the Supremacy Clause.90  
The history of the Supremacy Clause clearly shows that it was specifically 
drafted to ensure that treaties would be enforced not only by the federal government, 
but also by the states.  State legislators who have proposed statutes or constitutional 
amendments that forbid the consideration of treaty law show a distinct lack of 
historical understanding of the U.S. Constitution in general and the Supremacy 
Clause in particular.  They have completely disregarded the role that treaty law and 
the U.S.’s international obligations played in the adoption of the Constitution itself 
and have failed to grasp the role that treaties have played in the development of 
American jurisprudence.   
2.  SQ 755 Directly Conflicts with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
Which Establishes Treaties as the “Supreme Law of the Land” 
SQ 755 defines international law as including “international agreements, as well 
as treaties.”91  This violates the Supremacy Clause on its face.   
The Supremacy Clause explicitly includes treaty obligations as the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”  In Baldwin v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court makes clear that 
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states are obligated to abide by treaty provisions.92  Baldwin held that “treaties made 
by the United States and in force are part of the supreme law of the land, and . . . 
they are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are elsewhere 
throughout the dominion of the United States.”93  States have the same obligation to 
international law as does the federal government. 
While the word “treaties” does not appear in the amendment itself, SQ 755’s 
ballot title uses “treaties” in its definition of international law.  The people of 
Oklahoma voted on the ballot title when they passed SQ 755. 
Under Oklahoma law, a “ballot title is a contemporaneous construction of the 
constitutional amendment and as such weighs heavily in determining its meaning.”94  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently held that “[w]hen construing a constitutional 
amendment that was proposed by the Legislature . . . th[e] Court will read the ballot 
title together with the text of the measure, even if the text of the measure contains no 
ambiguities or absurdities.”95  The “Court will do so because those who framed and 
adopted the amendment considered the text of the measure and its ballot title 
together.”96  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court went on to say that “[t]he understanding of the 
Legislature as the framers and of the electorate as the adopters of the constitutional 
amendment is the best guide for determining an amendment’s meaning and scope, 
and such understanding is reflected in the language used in the measure and the 
ballot title.”97   
Under this rule of construction, articulated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the 
inclusion of the word “treaties” in SQ 755’s definition of international law renders 
the entire provision unconstitutional.  SQ 755’s ballot title makes clear that the state 
judiciary cannot consider a body of law that has been explicitly deemed the 
“supreme Law of the Land” by the U.S. Constitution.  As such, SQ 755 is in direct 
conflict with the Supremacy Clause and is pre-empted by it. 
3.  SQ 755’s Rejection of International Law Directly Conflicts with Well-Settled 
Law that International Law Is Part of Federal Common Law 
A state law is pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause when it directly conflicts 
with the force or purpose of federal law.98  Both history and case law make clear that 
international law, or the law of nations, is a well-established part of federal common 
law.  As noted in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, “[t]he law of nations forms an integral part 
of the common law, and a review of the history surrounding the adoption of the 
Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the common law of the United 
States upon the adoption of the Constitution.”99  
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In an 1815 case, The Nereide, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it “is bound by 
the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.”100  The Court confirmed its 
position in The Paquete Habana, decided in 1900, when it said that “[i]nternational 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it 
are duly presented for their determination.”101 
More recently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld 
the federal judiciary’s power to incorporate new international norms that are 
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act through their “residual common law 
discretion.”102  In Sosa, the Court relied in part on its 1964 decision in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, where it stated that “it is, of course, true that United 
States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate 
circumstances.”103   
Although the Supreme Court cautioned lower courts to exercise restraint in 
finding new international norms,104 even a restrictive reading of Sosa leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that customary international law remains a viable part of 
federal common law.  Even Justice Scalia, who in his concurrence questioned the 
federal judiciary’s authority to find causes of action that did not exist when the Alien 
Tort Statute was enacted, acknowledged that at least some portion of the “Law of 
Nations” is binding on all U.S. courts.105   
Moreover, the Sosa majority specifically rejected Justice Scalia’s position when 
it held that the federal courts are free to adjudicate claims based on “a narrow class 
of international norms” that have developed since the adoption of the Alien Tort 
Statute.106  Furthermore, the majority cited The Nereide and The Paquete Habana, 
noting that “[f]or two centuries [the Supreme Court] ha[s] affirmed that the domestic 
law of the United States recognizes the law of nations”107 and added that “[i]t would 
take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely 
from any international norm intended to protect individuals.”108 
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Erie v. Tompkins eliminated 
the federal judiciary’s ability to create common law.  “Erie did not in terms bar any 
judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and 
post-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may 
derive some substantive law in a common law way.”109  To support its finding, the 
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Court cited a number of cases, including Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc., where the Court recognized “that ‘international disputes implicating . . . our 
relations with foreign nations’ are one of the ‘narrow areas’ in which ‘federal 
common law’ continues to exist.”110 
SQ 755 and provisions like it violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because they foreclose the consideration of a body of federal common 
law that is binding on states.  For example, general maritime law mandates the 
consideration of customary international law in certain circumstances.111  States are 
obligated to apply general maritime law under the “‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine which 
requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing 
federal maritime standards.”112  Therefore, if a state court could not look to 
international law in a maritime case, it would be in violation of the clear dictates of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Not surprisingly, Oklahoma courts have acknowledged the importance of federal 
common law.  In an Oklahoma district court case, American Petrofina Co. v. 
Nance,113 which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,114 
the court stated that “[f]ederal common law is federal law as much as if it had been 
enacted by Congress.”115  The Petrofina court further explained that a conflict with 
federal common law would preempt any state law.116  Customary international law 
has long been categorized as being federal common law.117  Accordingly, enacting 
an amendment that forecloses the use of international law in decision-making is 
clearly against federal law, making the amendment unconstitutional. 
In conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged and upheld 
international principles for centuries because “[i]nternational law is part of our 
law.”118  Even the most restrictive view of customary international law must 
acknowledge that it is binding on all American courts and cannot be ignored by any 
state judiciary.  Therefore, any attempt to remove customary international law from 
state courts is unconstitutional on its face. 
IV.  SQ 755 AND PROVISIONS LIKE IT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION’S FULL FAITH 
AND CREDIT CLAUSE 
Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall 
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
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other State.”119  This means that states have an obligation to respect and uphold the 
law of other states.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that “[a] judgment 
entered in one State must be respected in another provided that the first State had 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.”120 
SQ 755 runs afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in two ways.  The first 
renders SQ 755 unconstitutional on its face.  The second way is less clear cut and 
would depend on how a judge interpreted SQ 755.    
A.  A State Cannot Condition Compliance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause on 
the Content of a Sister State’s Decision 
When applying choice of law principles, a state court can use public policy as a 
guide, however, “[r]egarding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is 
exacting.  A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory 
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for 
recognition throughout the land.”121  There is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to 
the full faith and credit due judgments.”122   
In Finstuen v. Crutcher, the Tenth Circuit applied these principles to invalidate 
an amendment to an Oklahoma statute that read “this state, any of its agencies, or 
any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of 
the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”123  The Tenth Circuit held 
that the statute was a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because out-of-
state adoption orders are “judgments” and therefore due the same deference as any 
other judicial determination.124  In rendering its decision, the panel made clear that 
the Tenth Circuit recognizes no public policy exception to the rule “that credit must 
be given to the judgment of another state.”125 
1.  SQ 755 Impermissibly Conditions Oklahoma’s Compliance with the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause on Whether or Not the Sister State Uses Sharia Law in its 
Opinions 
As with most challenged laws, the ultimate determination of SQ 755’s 
constitutionality rests on the interpretation that a reviewing court adopts.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that if a state enactment is “‘readily susceptible’ to a 
narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld.”126  But, 
a reviewing court should not strain to find a constitutional interpretation, the 
provision “must be ‘readily susceptible’ to the limitation.”127 
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“When . . . called upon to interpret state law,” the Tenth Circuit is obligated to 
“‘look to rulings of the highest state court, and if no such rulings exist, [the Panel] 
must endeavor to predict how the high court would rule.’”128  The court must 
interpret the language as it is actually used, “‘not in any abstract sense.’”129  
In pertinent part, SQ 755 provides that Oklahoma “[c]ourts . . . shall uphold and 
adhere to . . . if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the 
law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.”130  
The most expansive reading of that language leads to the conclusion that Oklahoma 
courts may never “uphold” or “adhere” to the law of another state if that state has 
ever used Sharia law in its judicial decisions.  Therefore, an Oklahoma court could 
conceivably conclude that if a New Jersey trial court used a precept of Sharia Law to 
determine a custody case, Oklahoma courts would thereafter be foreclosed from 
“upholding” or “adhering to” New Jersey judicial opinions.   
On the other hand, a restrictive interpretation of SQ 755 dictates that Oklahoma 
courts are not empowered to “uphold” or “adhere to” the law of another state only if 
the decision in question was based on Sharia Law.131 
Either interpretation places an impermissible condition on Oklahoma courts’ 
responsibility to uphold the judgments of sister states.  Under the rule adopted in 
Baker, Hall, and Finstuen, no state court is empowered to disregard a judgment 
rendered in another state, regardless of the law the other state applied.    
If enacted, SQ 755 would conflict with the Full Faith and Credit Clause in many 
ways.  For instance, many Muslims dictate that their estates are to be distributed in 
accordance with Sharia principles.  In fact, Mr. Awad’s concern that his will, which 
was drawn up in accordance with Sharia Law, would not be probated by an 
Oklahoma court was one of the reasons that Judge Miles-La Grange found that he 
had standing in Awad.132  
It does not take much creativity to imagine a situation where a Muslim with a 
will similar to Mr. Awad’s would not be protected under Oklahoma law.  Under SQ 
755, a Muslim who owns property in Oklahoma but resides in another state may not 
be able to properly distribute his or her assets.  In this scenario, the testator’s will is 
drawn up in accordance with Sharia Law, which means that an out-of-state probate 
court would have “considered” Sharia Law when issuing an order to distribute his or 
her assets.  An Oklahoma court would not be empowered to “uphold” the out-of-
state order.  Therefore, the Oklahoma court would be in violation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.  Similar issues could arise over marriages, divorces, adoptions, 
and contracts, which are all areas where at least some Muslims seek to abide by 
Sharia Law. 
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2.  Other State Law Measures Similar to SQ 755 Violate the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause 
Arizona’s legislature proposed a constitutional amendment, SCR 1010, that 
states: “courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to . . . if necessary, the laws of another 
state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include 
international law.”133  As discussed earlier, the particular condition that a state places 
on its compliance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause is immaterial; any condition 
is unconstitutional.   
Arizona’s condition, however, is particularly problematic because it explicitly 
singles out international law.  This position directly contradicts federal law.  In 
Skiriotes v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[i]nternational law is a part 
of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Union.”134  Therefore all state 
courts are required to recognize, uphold, and apply international law.   
Not surprisingly then, Arizona state courts have recognized the importance of 
international law and its needed application at the state level.  In State v. Miller, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that international law governed the extent of 
Arizona’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.135  In Miller, the state indicted the defendant 
for his role in disposing of diamond rings that were stolen from a JC Penney in 
Arizona.136  The case was dismissed at the trial level for lack of jurisdiction because 
the criminal conduct that the prosecution alleged occurred entirely outside of 
Arizona.137  On appeal the state claimed that the court had jurisdiction based on an 
Arizona statute that allowed for the prosecution of anyone that caused a “result” in 
Arizona.138 
First, relying in part on Skiriotes, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that 
international law governed a U.S. state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.139  Next, the 
court looked to a variety of sources, including the Restatement (Second) of the Law 
of Foreign Relations of the United States, before determining that like a nation-state, 
Arizona only has the authority to prescribe law for extraterritorial conduct when it 
has a “substantial effect” within the state.140  Noting that the continued deprivation 
of property did not constitute a “substantial effect,” the court upheld the dismissal 
because “Arizona must conform to international law in its exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.”141 
This principle is not limited to Arizona courts.  For instance, in Peters v. McKay, 
the Oregon Supreme Court applied international law to find that a state escheat 
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statute must be tolled during wartime.142  In State v. Marley, even though the 
Hawaiian Supreme Court ultimately found that international law was inapplicable to 
the case at bar, it recognized that Skiriotes requires that “‘international law’ takes 
precedence over . . . state statutes in . . . limited situations.”143  
If enacted, SCR 1010 would render Arizona courts powerless to uphold and 
adhere to decisions like Miller and Peters or to abide by decisions that recognize the 
principle articulated in Marley.  Paradoxically, an out-of-state court could find that 
its decision is void in Arizona because the judge applied the legal reasoning of 
Miller, an Arizona case.  This result would be not only comical, but also 
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
B.  SQ 755’s Prohibition on Considering International Law or Foreign Law May 
also Violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The portion of SQ 755 that forbids Oklahoma courts from considering 
international law and the legal precepts of other nations (foreign law) may be read as 
a de facto prohibition on upholding out-of-state judgments that are based on those 
doctrines.144  This of course would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
But, there is a way that the portion of SQ 755 that forbids the 
consideration/application of foreign and international law can be read 
constitutionally.  This section discusses both scenarios. 
States consider both international law and foreign law in a variety of situations, 
including “serving process, conducting discovery, ensuring recognition of foreign 
judgments, assessing rights under foreign law in probate and domestic relations 
matters, deciding choice of law issues, and in interpreting contracts with forum 
selection clauses.”145  Although international law and foreign law are distinct, for 
purposes of this analysis, the distinctions are immaterial. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the ubiquity of international and foreign 
law in American courts.  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court included 
the following citations to show that in some cases, the presumptive choice of law is 
foreign law.146   
Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam) 
(noting that Texas would apply Cambodian law to wrongful-death action 
involving explosion in Cambodia of an artillery round manufactured in 
United States); Thomas v. FMC Corp., 610 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Ala. 
1985) (applying German law to determine American manufacturer’s 
liability for negligently designing and manufacturing a Howitzer that 
killed decedent in Germany); Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. 
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Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970) (noting that Italian law applies to allegations of 
negligent manufacture in Kansas that resulted in an airplane crash in 
Italy); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969) 
(applying Italian law to determine American corporation’s liability for 
negligent manufacture of a plane that crashed in Italy).147 
Along these lines, a majority of states have enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA) of 1962, or its 2005 revision, the Uniform 
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.148  Under UFMJRA, most 
states treat the money award of a foreign court as a sister state judgment.149  Once a 
state court has found a foreign judgment enforceable under UFMJRA, it “has the 
same effect as a domestic judgment.”150  As discussed earlier, domestic judgments 
are entitled to full faith and credit throughout the nation. 
A state cannot subvert its duty to uphold the judgments of sister state courts by 
enacting policy exclusions in its constitution.  Therefore, all states are required to 
give full faith and credit to sister state judgments regardless of whether the judgment 
in question considered international law or foreign law.  For instance, if a New York 
court reached a decision in a contract case by applying French law, that decision 
would be valid in every state in the union.  But, SQ 755 calls that conclusion into 
question.  It is not clear that Oklahoma courts would be allowed to “uphold” or 
“adhere” to an out-of-state decision that is based on foreign law. 
Under the established rule of comity between states laid down in Baker, Hall, 
and Finstuen, a state cannot direct its courts to disregard a decision of another state, 
regardless of the body of law upon which the decision was based.  Therefore, any 
attempt to circumscribe a state court’s duty to uphold a sister state’s judgment, 
regardless of the doctrine the sister state drew on for its decision, is indeed a facial 
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Unlike the portion of SQ 755 that forbids an Oklahoma court from upholding 
out-of-state decisions that are based on Sharia Law, which is void on its face, a 
challenge to the prohibition on looking to international law or foreign law will 
largely depend on a court’s interpretation of the amendment’s text.  As such, SQ 755 
is likely subject to a constitutional interpretation.  In the amendment’s text, the 
prohibition on looking to international law or foreign law is separate from the 
portion that dictates that an Oklahoma court cannot “uphold” or “adhere” to the law 
of another state.  Since those portions are separate, a court could reasonably find that 
Oklahoma courts are empowered to uphold the judgments of sister states, even when 
the judgments are based on international law or foreign law.   
A state court is not generally empowered to inquire into the merits of a sister 
state’s judgment.  Most notably, in Fauntleroy v. Lum, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a Mississippi court must enforce the judgment of a court in Missouri even where 
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the Missouri decision was based on a misinterpretation of Mississippi law.151  
Therefore, an Oklahoma court will not necessarily have to “look to the legal precepts 
of other nations or cultures”152 in order to uphold a sister state judgment that is based 
on foreign or international law. 
If a court reads the provision narrowly, however, and rejects a sister state’s 
decision based on international or foreign law, that decision could be challenged as a 
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.    
V.  SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES 
Upon first reading, it would appear that SQ 755 raises separation of powers 
issues.  Separation of powers is the term that describes the distribution of authority 
amongst the branches of government.  When one branch intrudes on the domain of 
another, the doctrine of separation of powers is normally invoked to invalidate the 
action.  
SQ 755 specifically forbids the judiciary from considering both international law 
and foreign law, which seems to intrude on the independence of the judiciary.  But 
upon closer inspection, SQ 755 stands up to a separation of powers challenge 
because it is a constitutional amendment.  Constitutional amendments fundamentally 
alter the balance of power amongst the political branches.  Therefore, many states, 
including Oklahoma, generally hold that an amendment to the state constitution 
cannot violate the document itself.153   
There are a few state legislatures that have introduced bills, rather than 
constitutional amendments, that would forbid state judiciaries from considering 
international law.  These measures are more susceptible to challenges based on 
separation of powers.  
The distribution of powers amongst a state’s political branches is not generally a 
federal concern.154  However, a state legislature’s intrusion on a state judiciary may 
run afoul of the separation of powers mandated by the state’s constitution.  Unlike 
the U.S. Constitution, which does not contain an explicit separation of powers 
requirement, many state constitutions do include express separation of powers 
requirements.155 
Since the Great Depression, separation of powers has diminished on the federal 
level, but the doctrine remains vital in many states.156  Although it would be a 
                                                          
 
151
 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). 
 
152
 H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
 
153
 See, e.g., E. Okla. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Pitts, 82 P.3d 1008, 1012 (Okla. 
2003) (stating that the Oklahoma Supreme Court “fail[ed] to understand how an amendment 
to the Oklahoma Constitution could be found to violate that constitution”); Strauss v. Horton, 
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2008) (finding that a constitutional amendment that overruled a California 
Supreme Court’s decision implicitly amended the California Constitution rendering the earlier 
decision moot). 
 
154
 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) (“[W]hen . . . a state 
constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to 
hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.”). 
 
155
 Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable 
Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (1998). 
 
156
 Id. at 1418. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss2/3
2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA’S SQ 755 213 
 
mistake to apply the federal conception of separation of powers to every state, most 
state constitutions do require some semblance of judicial independence.157  Telling 
courts which law they can and cannot consider when deciding a case is arguably a 
violation of the judicial independence that most state constitutions guarantee the 
judiciary.   
Whether or not a provision violates a particular state’s conception of separation 
of powers will largely depend on the language of the provision, the text of the state 
constitution, and the relevant case law that establishes the limit of the legislature’s 
authority to direct the judiciary.  While legislatures are generally empowered to 
direct courts by adopting positive law, forbidding the application of a valid and 
viable doctrine that has been respected in the U.S. for hundreds of years usurps one 
of the judiciary’s core functions, which is to determine which law is applicable in a 
given case. 
Regardless, however, of whether the legislature’s regulation of the judiciary 
raises separation of powers issues that rise to a constitutional level, SQ 755 and 
provisions like it reflect a mistrust and misunderstanding of the role of the judiciary.  
These provisions ignore that individual judges are kept in check by the appellate 
process.  Any judge who strays too far from precedent can be re-calibrated by the 
appellate court that reviews his decision.  This holds true of trial courts and of first-
level appellate courts.  Moreover, the make-up of state supreme courts also provides 
an internal check.  Because supreme courts are composed of multiple individuals, 
first-level appellate decisions are scrutinized by multiple judges who are interpreting 
and reviewing the law.   
This does not mean that all judges agree, or that litigants agree with judges’ 
interpretations of the law.  But, the multiple checks on judges that are built into the 
system at least guarantee that if a judge blatantly disregards or makes up the law, a 
reviewing court will correct his breach of duty.  It is inconceivable that a state’s 
entire judicial system is so biased or corrupt that everyone within it will compromise 
well-settled legal principles. 
 SQ 755 and provisions like it throw a wrench into the very workings of the legal 
system.   While not challengeable on constitutional or other grounds for doing so, 
those provisions serve to de-stabilize Oklahoma and other state courts. 
VI.  SQ 755 AND SIMILAR PROVISIONS WOULD EVISCERATE WELL-ESTABLISHED 
PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT THE INTEGRITY OF STATE 
COURTS 
In addition to running afoul of the Constitution, SQ 755 and similar provisions 
also clash with general principles of comity.  Although this does not make them 
vulnerable constitutionally, it calls into question generally accepted rules of judicial 
interpretation and places courts at a loss for how to resolve disputes that require the 
application of foreign and international law.  
Courts regularly apply judgments from other jurisdictions and foreign courts in 
deciding a host of cases, including cases with family law issues, contract disputes, 
and testamentary issues.  As a general rule, the laws and judgments of foreign 
nations are typically granted consideration under the principle of comity, as long as 
they do not conflict with public policy.158  This is also true in Oklahoma.  Indeed, a 
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1903 Oklahoma case defines comity as: “the courtesy by which nations recognize 
within their own territory, or in their own courts, the peculiar institutions of another 
nation or the rights and privileges acquired by its citizens in their own land.”159  
Without the ability to look to foreign and international law to extend this 
courtesy, Oklahoma and other courts bound by provisions similar to SQ 755 will 
have a difficult time adjudicating cases that come before them.  Those cases are not 
cutting edge cases of first impression.  Rather, they are in large part, bread-and-
butter cases with no notable jurisprudential implications.  For example, in Leitch v. 
Leitch,160 a couple had been married in Canada and later divorced in Canada.  The 
Canadian divorce decree required that one spouse pay the other $2,500 per month in 
child support payments.  The paying spouse then moved to Iowa, where he fell 
behind on payments.  Using principles of comity, the Iowa court upheld and 
enforced the Canadian child support decree.161  
Similarly, in Compagnie Generale de Fourrures,162 a French corporation sued a 
New York corporation for breach of contract.  Since the “meeting of the minds” had 
occurred in France, the court applied French contract law to resolve the dispute.163  
Courts have also considered foreign law in circumstances relating to 
testamentary disposition.164  For example, a New Jersey court had to determine 
whether a man had been domiciled in France or New Jersey.165  The court looked to 
French law to adjudicate this question.  French law required persons to apply and be 
approved for a domiciliary permit by French authorities before they could be 
considered legally domiciled in France.  Since the man had never complied with that 
requirement, the New Jersey court held that the man had never been domiciled in 
France and was domiciled in New Jersey.166  
As these cases demonstrate, state courts throughout the nation apply comity 
principles in a uniform manner and as a matter of course.  If SQ 755 and other 
provisions like it go into effect, courts will be precluded from using well-established 
methods of interpretation.  Additionally, courts will have to re-litigate routine issues 
already addressed by foreign courts.  
This will place an unnecessary burden on state court systems.  It will also have 
an impact on litigants and their lawyers.  If these provisions go into effect and 
eviscerate principles of comity, lawyers would not be able to evaluate applicable law 
and counsel their clients.  Litigants and lawyers will not be able to rely on Oklahoma 
courts (and other courts in states with similar provisions) for a fair adjudication of 
their claims.   
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This has the potential of undermining the validity of the state courts.  Courts will 
be seen as provincial tribunals that put local interests over well-settled legal 
doctrines, rather than as neutral arbiters of the law.  Indeed, Justice Breyer recently 
stated that in order for courts to retain their legitimacy, the “law has to be stable. . . .  
People have to live their lives depending upon law.”167  He made clear that 
consistency is essential for the administration of justice by our courts and their 
continued survival. 
VII.  THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF SQ 755 ON ARBITRATION DECISIONS 
Additionally, SQ 755 calls into question the Oklahoma state courts’ enforcement 
of arbitration decisions between Oklahoma and foreign companies.  At least two of 
Oklahoma’s commercial statutes, the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, provide that contracts may incorporate 
arbitration clauses,168 and that foreign judgments will be recognized in arbitration.169  
These well-established commercial statutes govern contract disputes.  The plain 
language of SQ 755 however, could trump the application of international and 
foreign law to resolve those disputes—overriding the contracting parties’ negotiated-
upon choice of law provisions.    
The legislature clearly did not take into account the economic impact and 
negative consequences that SQ 755 would have on state corporations doing business 
with foreign entities.  Oklahoma’s vigorous transportation, energy, and oil sectors 
are areas where state contracts subject to international arbitration clauses could be 
trumped by the amendment.  The state’s international business agreements and 
important trade contracts in these sectors will be depressed if foreign or international 
entities are not guaranteed their contract rights in Oklahoma courts.170 
To illustrate this, an Oklahoma builder may enter into a contract with a British 
cement company that incorporates either the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) or another resolution system such as the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for dispute resolution procedures.  The 
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contract may also specify that English law would apply to any disputes.  If the 
Oklahoma builder has a claim against the British company arising in the course of 
performance of that contract, it would be handled by the AAA or ICSID, which 
would apply English law.  When a judgment ultimately issues from that arbitration, 
it is unclear how the Oklahoma state court could enforce that judgment under SQ 
755.  
The losing party could attempt to block the judgment’s enforcement under SQ 
755’s prohibition on applying foreign or international law.  This is true even though 
Oklahoma’s statutes pertaining to contract enforcement make clear that the builder’s 
arbitration decision should be governed by the state’s commercial statutes mandating 
uniform enforcement of foreign judgments.  SQ 755, in contrast, would enable a 
litigant to argue that Oklahoma courts cannot honor the arbitrator’s decision or 
enforce it because international law was used by the arbitrator.  The impact on the 
foreign or international entities being sued in Oklahoma would be confusion and a 
mistrust of Oklahoma’s judicial system.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Constitutional and statutory provisions like Oklahoma’s SQ 755 that are 
proliferating throughout the country are unconstitutional in several respects.  Aside 
from the obvious First Amendment problems, which have been successfully 
challenged in court, these provisions also run afoul of other constitutional 
provisions, namely the Supremacy Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause.  This 
makes them subject to facial challenges on those grounds.  Comparable statutory 
provisions currently being contemplated by several states also may run afoul of the 
supremacy clauses of the constitutions in those states.  
Provisions that prevent courts from applying international law, including treaty 
law, ignore the history of the Constitution in general and the formation of the 
Supremacy Clause in particular.  One of the reasons that the Supremacy Clause was 
added to the Constitution by the Founding Fathers was so that states would respect 
international treaties.  This was critical to our survival as a nation, as the British 
refused to withdraw from the American Confederacy because states were violating 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolutionary War. 
As this paper also discusses, SQ 755 and provisions like it have the potential of 
disrupting entire state legal systems.  Courts will be constrained if they can no longer 
adhere to the well-established principle of comity, which requires states to recognize 
foreign judgments that rely on foreign or international law.  This will impact the 
legal system as a whole.  Judges will have to invent new ways to decide cases and 
will have to re-litigate issues that have already been decided.  Consequently, lawyers 
will not be able to counsel their clients.  The strengths and weaknesses of particular 
cases cannot be assessed if traditional and well-established principles of comity are 
no longer in effect.   
These provisions also impact businesses.  International businesses may think 
twice about doing business with Oklahoma and other states with provisions similar 
to SQ 755 if they cannot incorporate foreign or international law into contracts or 
arbitration provisions.  
The obvious sentiments underlying these provisions are deep-seated xenophobia 
and contempt for the “foreign” and “international.”  As this paper discusses, 
however, the subtext is less obvious, but equally troubling.  These provisions reflect 
a deep mistrust of the judiciary as a separate branch of government.  They are 
attempts by legislators to regulate the courts.  Implicit in these provisions is the 
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notion that judges cannot be trusted to administer justice and that they must be 
stopped from subjugating state interests to foreign and international interests.  But, 
these provisions display a lack of understanding of how the judiciary functions.  As 
such, they de-legitimize state courts by forcing them to diverge from well-
established decision-making principles.  This serves no good purpose in a country 
that is respected for its adherence to the rule of law, which is made possible only 
through the continued existence of an independent judiciary.   
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